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Abstract: Using a novel dataset of 121 Chinese P2P lending platforms, we investigate the impact of 
CEOs’ banking experience on default risk. The empirical results indicate that CEOs with prior 
banking experience manage default risk better. Moreover, CEOs’ banking experience has a stronger 
influence on small platforms and in situations where the platforms’ depository banks are city 
commercial banks. Our results indicate that although fintech provides technology to reduce risks, we 
cannot ignore the constructive role of professional experience in risk management. Thus, investors 
and regulators in emerging markets should pay attention to managers’ financial qualifications, and 
especially to CEOs’ banking experience. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature includes diverse perspectives on the effects that executives’ financial backgrounds have on 
corporation performance and risk control. According to higher echelon theory, executives with financial 
or legal backgrounds typically pay more attention to budget planning and the design of incentive 
compensation systems, both of which are ultimately beneficial to company development (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). Moreover, Hayes et al. (2007) argue that financially trained managers tend to reduce 
corporate risk by parceling it out among a sufficiently large number of separate product lines, businesses, 
or technologies. A more detailed study shows that independent directors (such as CFOs, treasurers, or 
controllers) with CPA or CFA certificates, or with management experience in financial companies, tend 
to be more effective in supervising corporations (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). However, managers with 
related financial education (such as MBA degrees) tend to follow more aggressive strategies (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003), and firms headed by financial expert CEOs tend to be more leveraged (Custódio and 
Metzger, 2014). Having managers with these kinds of financial expertise may induce greater risk-taking. 
In addition, substantial evidence shows that commercial or investment bankers serving on boards tend to 
invest in projects with good credit prospects but poor investment opportunities (Guner et al., 2008). 
We provide a new angle for examining the effects that executives’ degrees of financial experience have 
on firms’ risk management strategies in emerging markets. In 2018, China's volume of online loan 
transactions was the highest in the world, reaching $178.9 
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billion. Since then, China's P2P online lending industry has entered a policy adjustment period, after its periods of initial develop-
ment, rapid expansion, and risk explosion. The lack of supervision in the P2P industry before 2016 created a large number of illegal
platforms. Subsequently, a regulatory policy was promulgated, and regulation was tightened. The problematic chain of platform
capital broke, the P2P online lending industries frequently crashed, and a large number of investors gained no returns or lost money.
Using a novel database from the National Internet Finance Association of China (NIFA), we investigate the impact that CEOs with
prior banking experience have on platforms’ default risks. We manually collect data on 121 P2P Chinese lending platforms that were
registered with the NIFA from June 2017 to February 2019. We find consistent evidence that platforms led by CEOs with banking
experience perform better in corporate risk management. Furthermore, having managers with banking experience has a stronger
positive effect on small-scale platforms than on larger platforms. In addition, if a platform's depository banks are city commercial
banks, then the platform's risk of default tends to decrease significantly.
Our paper provides a new perspective on the existing literature by indicating that executives’ financial experience positively
effects firm operations, especially in an emerging market. In addition, our paper's findings differ from those of the existing P2P
lending default risk literature, which has mainly focused on the characteristics of individual loans, e.g., the borrowers’ reputation
(Ding et al., 2018; Li and Hu, 2019) or loan type (Zhou and Wei, 2018).Our approach is to examine the executives’ background
characteristics across platforms and examine how the CEOs’ banking experience affect firms’ operations.
2. Data and specification
2.1. Data
We manually collected data on P2P platforms from the NIFA website (www.nifa.org.cn), WDZJ (www.wdzj.com), and P2P Eye
(www.p2peye.com). NIFA is a national association led by the People's Bank of China. Most P2P investors trust information on the
NIFA website because it is endorsed by a number of national regulatory commissions. Additionally, WDZJ and P2P Eye are private
websites that focus on disclosing information on Internet finance in China. As the registration and information disclosure services
were both available starting from June 2017, the period of our platform operations sample runs from June 2017 to February 2019. As
some data on executives were not available on the NIFA website, we gained a more complete dataset by adding data from the WDZJ
and P2P Eye databases.
The sampled platforms include 121 P2P lending platforms that were registered with the NIFA before February 28, 2019, and the
final sample comprises 1,649 observations. Table 1 provides the definitions of the variables and the data sources. To address the
banking experience of the CEOs, we set a dummy variable at one when the CEO of the platform used to work in a bank. We proxy for
default risk by using the overdue rate. Table 2 reports the summary of these statistics.
2.2. Specification
We examine the impacts that CEOs with prior banking experience have on the sampled platforms’ overdue rates, with the
following specification:
= + + + + +DefaultRisk D Z Xit i i it t it0 (1)
where i, t are subscripts representing the platform and month, respectively, and DefaultRiskit is the dependent variable, measured by
the overdue rate (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). In this paper, we use the monthly overdue rate to proxy for platform risk, for two
reasons. First, the literature uses this measure to indicate risks of default in microfinance institutions that arise due to delays in
repayment and to high default rates (Setargie, 2013). Second, the fintech sector in China is quite different from those in the U.S. and
Europe in terms of risk management. According to a recent report by DBS Group Research, variables such as the amounts of overdue
Table 1
Variable definitions and data sources.
Variables Definitions Sources
Overdue Monthly amount overdue (in%) for each platform NIFA
Pbank Dummy variable indicating whether the CEO has prior banking experience NIFA
WDZJ; P2P eye
P_age CEO's age NIFA; WDZJ; P2P eye
P_gender Dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is female NIFA; WDZJ; P2P eye
P_one Dummy variable indicating whether the director of the board is also the CEO NIFA
Abank Dummy variable indicating whether one of the CFOs or CROs has banking experience NIFA; WDZJ; P2P eye
A_age The CFO's and CRO's average age NIFA; WDZJ; P2P eye
A_gender Dummy variable indicating whether one of the CFOs or CROs is female NIFA; WDZJ; P2P eye
Num The total number of executives (including the CEO, chairman, CFOs, and CROs). NIFA
Bank_d Dummy variable indicating whether the depository bank of a P2P platform is a commercial bank NIFA
Boi The ratio of borrowers to investors (monthly) NIFA
Ln_curloan Logarithm of the current loan volume NIFA
Ln_avgaccloan Logarithm of the average accumulated loan volume NIFA
Com_rate The ratio of the current outstanding amount to the previous lending amount (monthly) NIFA




Variable Count Mean SD Min Max
Overdue 2,047 1.4207 5.3052 0.0000 66.0000
Pbank 2,051 0.3706 0.4831 0.0000 1.0000
P_age 1,934 41.2309 6.7093 29.0000 63.0000
P_gender 2,051 0.2179 0.4129 0.0000 1.0000
P_one 2,051 0.5378 0.4987 0.0000 1.0000
Abank 1,982 0.5414 0.4984 0.0000 1.0000
A_age 1,792 38.5832 6.8495 26.0000 64.0000
A_gender 1892 0.4260 0.4946 0.0000 1.0000
Num 2,051 2.9132 1.3997 1.0000 7.0000
Bank_d 2051 0.5592 0.4966 0.0000 1.0000
Boi 2,051 7.2829 22.3009 −0.9799 156.9020
Ln_curloan 1,838 9.7193 2.3438 −3.9120 16.3028
Ln_avgaccloan 2,035 11.6693 1.8668 6.8888 17.0492
Com_rate 1,765 −0.1746 1.4070 −9.8177 2.2854






























Monthly Fixed Effect Yes Yes
N 2,047 1,459
R-squared 0.0625 0.2201




Whether a platform is in an abnormal condition Overdue Rate Drop 35 platforms 3-month Overdue Rate
Pbank 0.476*** −0.954*** −0.043***
(5.14) (−3.10) (−4.89)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
N 1,459 1,178 1,311
R-squared 0.1684 0.2501 0.130
T-statistics are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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loans, overdue risk, and accumulated loans are crucial for conducting risk control on P2P platforms in China's fintech sector. Di is the
key explanatory variable, which indicates whether the CEO of platform i has prior banking experience. Zi is the executive-level
control variables, including the CEO's age and gender, whether the director of board is also the CEO, the CFO's and CRO's banking
experience, and the age, gender, and number of executives. Xit are the platform-level control variables, including the depository bank
type, the ratio of borrowers to investors, the current loan volume, the average accumulated loan volume, and the ratio of the current
compensation amount to the previous borrowing amount. Accordingly, α, β, and γ are the coefficients that reflect the effects on
DefaultRiskit. Finally, we include month dummies (θt) as the time fixed effects, and εit is the error term.
3. Estimation results
3.1. Baseline results
Table 3 shows the baseline results. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that CEOs with banking experience have a significantly positive
impact on controlling default risk, as they reduce the overdue rate by 0.470%. In Column 2 of Table 3, this result still holds when
controlling for other traits of CEOs, the characteristics of other executives, and the platform-level variables.2
In addition, we show four robustness checks in Table 4. First, we provide some evidence by using survival analysis. The odds ratio
for the variable pbank is 0.476(< 1) in Column 1, which means that a CEO with banking experience tends to have a lower likelihood
of having platform risks. Second, we drop the 35 platforms that changed their CEOs after their initial stages of establishment. Third,
we use a 3-month overdue rate to replace the monthly overdue rate. All these three results are robust to the baseline estimation.
3.2. Heterogeneous effects
Large banks tend to specialize in lending to relatively large firms, and small banks have advantages in lending to smaller firms
(Berger and Black, 2011). We find consistent results in Columns 1–2 of Table 5. As most P2P platforms target small business, small
platforms are likely to be good at keeping contact with small businesses, to know their demands better, and to better control their
probability of default.
As the depository banks of P2P platforms play an important role in risk management (Zhu, 2018), we divide the sample into two
types: Platforms with city commercial banks and those with non-city commercial banks. The results are reported in Columns 3–4 of
Table 5. The regression results indicate that CEOs of P2P platforms with prior banking experience tend to have lower transaction costs
when working with commercial banks, as their management and finance experience are both mainly concerned with microloans. In
this regard, the cooperation between city commercial banks and P2P platforms whose CEOs have prior banking experience can help
those P2P platforms to control risks.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we find that platforms run by CEOs with prior banking experience have significantly lower risk of default. The
heterogeneous results show that CEOs’ banking experience has a stronger influence on small platforms and in cases where the
platforms’ depository banks are city commercial banks.
Our paper has several implications for policy and investment. First, investors in P2P platforms should consider not just the
operational information on the platforms, but also the platform CEOs’ professional backgrounds, especially their banking experience.
Second, regulators in emerging markets should make guidelines regarding the platform CEOs’ qualifications. Not everyone is qua-




Platform size Type of depository bank
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Small platform Big platform City commercial bank Non-city commercial bank
Pbank −1.345*** −0.162 −0.611** −0.822
(−2.70) (−0.76) (−1.99) (−1.64)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 800 693 806 653
R-squared 0.1634 0.1427 0.3565 0.1808
T-statistics are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
2 We also use the propensity score matching method to solve the potential endogeneity problem. Due to space limitations, the results from this
method are not shown. The details are available upon request.
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